A Conversation with Mr Shyam Saran

Interviewed by Prem Ansh Sinha (Editor-in-Chief)

Transcript edited by Maleeha Parvez Wani (Assistant Editor) & Alankrita Singh (Associate Editor)

Mr Shyam Saran is a former foreign secretary of India and the former Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board.

An edited transcript of the interview, as taken on 6 May 2024, at the India International Centre, is as follows. 

Mr Saran, I came across a very interesting thing while researching the questions yesterday. A Kathmandu Post article reads, ‘You are wrong, Shyam Saran.’ The article dates back to 2016, which is a response to your article that was published in Hindustan Times, titled ‘Kathmandu’s Triumphalism about China is Misplaced’. It calls your observations one-sided and your statements factually incorrect. I went through it and found one or two genuine reasons. It raises questions about the forceful expulsion of over 100,000 Bhutanese-Nepalese or Lhotshampas in 1990, and it says it happened with the approval of India. It questions the democratic view that India preaches to Nepal. How do you see this?

Why is India considered to be guilty of something?

They say that the Bhutanese military was heavily involved in this particular expulsion, and all of us know that the Indian military is quite in harmony with them as well.

We have a military training team in Bhutan, but there is no assumption that the Bhutanese army follows the instructions of the Indian training team there. Whatever may have been the decision by Bhutan to expel those people of Nepali origin who were their residents but not citizens, and who had presumably been there to work over a period of time,  Bhutan wanted to make sure a lot of the illegal immigrants who had come into the country should go back to their country, and that particular decision was taken by Bhutan, and India had nothing to do with that decision. It is another matter that it is true that most of these people went back to Nepal through Indian territory because they could not get back to Nepal except through Indian territory. That India allowed them to use the territory to go back to their country of origin, I cannot see why somebody should believe that India is complicit in terms of that expulsion.

Sir, you said that these people who were expelled to Nepal were illegal immigrants, but while my research, I came across another article on The Diplomat where it was written that these people have been in Bhutan since the 1620s, and they were the Newar craftsmen who were brought to build a stupa in Bhutan. This is a very popular narrative that is there. 

It may be a popular narrative in terms of what their status is or what is the history of them having come and lived in Bhutan. That is something which is between Bhutan and Nepal. It is not something that India should be brought in as somehow being connected with that controversy. The only role which India played in that respect was, as I mentioned to you, that it provided transit to those people who came through India and went back to Nepal. But India did not have any complicity in terms of the decision taken by the Bhutanese government. So if there is any responsibility in terms of that expulsion, it is the Bhutanese government that is to be questioned.

Why did India not intervene? We have seen that we have been a part whenever such a thing happened in a neighbouring country and we try to micromanage the issues in these states. So, why did we not interfere when over one-sixth of the population of Bhutan was expelled?

I think that the assumption you are making that India ‘micromanages’ such affairs in its neighbouring countries is simply not correct. These are independent, sovereign countries. How can India consider it to be appropriate to interfere in their internal affairs? If we do not want any outside country to interfere in our internal affairs why should we do the same to other countries?

But in the 1950s we saw Pandit Nehru writing an explicit letter where he admonished the Prime Minister MP Koirala about the heavy expenditure of the Nepalese delegation when they attended the coronation ceremony of Queen Elizabeth II. He said that they no longer had the Rana-rule in Nepal and they should be spending their amount wisely. Although, it was a very wise advice that was given by Pandit Nehru, the former Prime Minister of India, it was not received well by the Nepali government and was seen as an act of interference in their rights. So, how do you see this?

What was the precise reason behind this?

What happened was that the delegation that attended the coronation ceremony of Queen Elizabeth II had spent enormous money on partying and various other things which Pandit Nehru did not like and thus, this letter had been written.

So, I am not very sure what the precise reason is why we might have faced this issue. The fact is that during those early years, India was providing a great deal of financial assistance and resources to Nepal, which, as you know, has been a very poor country. And, there may have been a reason why Pandit Nehru may have thought that on one hand, India is supporting Nepal with such assistance, and on the other hand, that the resources that Nepal should be using perhaps much more wisely were not being used. India was certainly the country which had very close relations with Nepal. And as you know, the Indian government under Pandit Nehru played an important role in the restoration of the monarchy in Nepal because Tribhuvan was more or less like a puppet king.

But we saw King Mahendra turning against the government of India.

Well, that is something which happened later because the kind of person that King Tribhuvan was and what King Mahendra was, they were two very different people. On one hand, Tribhuvan was ready to accept a political dispensation of multi-party democracy in Nepal. And so, the Nepali Congress played a very important role in that respect. By the time we came to King Mahendra, that situation had changed. Because King Mahendra feels that the multi-party system was not necessarily very appropriate to Nepal, that Nepal's development required having perhaps a much stronger political leadership, and he also saw an opportunity for Nepal and for himself to expand the role of the monarchy by taking advantage of the fact that there was a new tension building up between India and China.

In 1959, the Tibet Revolt took place. Relations between India and China became much more tense and in that kind of a situation, Nepal, and particularly King Mahendra, felt that they could have greater space and opportunity to assert their independence and sovereignty vis-à-vis India because India was the most powerful influence in Nepal at that particular point of time. It played very well with Mahendra that he was able to use this opportunity not only to create a certain amount of distance between India and Nepal, but at the same time, he could take the action that he did with respect to internal politics in Nepal by asserting that multi-party democracy was not suitable for Nepal and that Nepal would do better by having a much stronger political leadership with a monarchical form of government. So, you have to examine the political context in which some of these changes took place.

So, since you are all political science students, it is important for you, in terms of examining or analysing political events, to look at not just a particular set of events, but always to contextualise it; what is the setting within which a certain decision may have been taken by a political leader or why did India take a certain foreign policy direction that it did at a certain point of time. Sometimes, we look back upon something and then criticise it from our current standpoint. That is not the way to analyse the situation. You have to look at what was happening at that time. So, that historical context becomes very important in terms of coming to the right kind of conclusions about any particular political development.

While you are talking about King Tribhuvan and Prince Mahendra, who later became the King of Nepal as well, let's go back to the time when India stood against the Rana rule in Nepal and the Indian ambassador to Nepal, Mr CPN Singh, granted asylum to King Tribhuvan in the embassy of India in Nepal. What do you think of the whole situation? What was the context behind it? What was the reason that India thought that King Tribhuvan could be a good alternative to the Rana rule? 

The Rana rule was ruled by a certain narrow aristocracy in Nepal. It was certainly not democratic, and it was a government which was very much against any form of democracy, much less multi-party democracy. When India's national movement was taking place, there were democrats from Nepal who also took part in India's national movement. So, the Nepali Congress leaders like Koirala, for example, became part and parcel of the Indian national movement.

There was a very close affinity between those democratic forces, which were trying to fight for their own place in Nepal, with the Indian National Movement. The Indian National Movement was not only a movement for independence, but it was also a movement for democracy, and the kind of political dispensation which we adopted after independence was a liberal democratic state.

Therefore, those who were working together with the Indian National Congress here in India wanted their countries to move in the direction of democracy, like India. It should come as no surprise that there was a considerable amount of support and affinity on the part of India for those democratic forces in Nepal. So the train of events that followed after this was really to see how India could support those democratic forces in Nepal to establish a democracy like India had established in its own country. Now, you could also argue that there was a certain strategic dimension to it. The strategic dimension is that Nepal is going to be, from the point of view of India's security, a very important country, just being south of the Himalayas. So, in terms of safeguarding India's security, having a democratic government in Nepal was favourable.

You already had China, which had moved into Tibet in 1950. Tibet, until that time, was almost an independent country. We had very strong cultural and religious links with Tibet. Even though throughout history, China had tried to claim its sovereignty over Tibet, the fact is that for most of its history, Tibet was not under Chinese rule. So in 1950, when Chinese troops moved into Tibet, in a sense, this was the first time that India and China had a broad boundary between each other. Before that, they didn't have a boundary except for in the western sector, with Xinjiang and Kashmir. From the point of view of that political affinity as democratic forces, and also from the point of view of having a government in Nepal which would also be sensitive to India's security concerns, was something which India certainly promoted. It was encouraged that there should be a legitimate government which came into power in Nepal, and the legitimate government was that of King Tribhuvan. The Ranas were not rejecting monarchy and wanted the monarch to be the ruler of the country, but essentially as just a figurehead without exercising actual power. What India did at that time was to say that the person who was only being treated as a figurehead should actually be the person exercising the power. That is how whatever train of events that you are talking about took place, where Tribhuvan became the King and opened the door for multiparty democracy to be established in Nepal, which survived till the 1960s.

Before moving ahead with the next question, while we are in that particular decade, I would like to bring up another question to you with respect to the 1950 Treaty of India and Nepal. When this treaty was being designed, did India expect that the border that Nepal shares with Tibet would cease to exist, and that it would be the People's Republic of China that would be taking over Tibet?

As I mentioned to you, 1950 is also the year when the Chinese forces moved into Tibet. It was already very clear to India that the security landscape for India had changed dramatically and that it could no longer look upon Tibet as a vast space which, in a sense, kept China away from India.

 So, India knew Tibet would no longer be a deterrent to China?

Tibet had ceased to exist as an independent state.

But we were trying to send delegations to Tibet in the mid-1950s. Pandit Nehru was sending delegations to request them to apply for membership of the United Nations. It has been mentioned by Mr MK Rasgotra, the former foreign secretary, as well. 

In 1949, when China established the People's Republic, it laid claim to all the territories which belonged to the old Qing Empire, whether Xinjiang or Tibet. In fact, Xinjiang means new territory. It is called ‘new territory’  because it was incorporated into the Chinese Empire at a much later date. So, the situation that we faced as an independent country after India became independent in 1947 was that there was Tibet, which was, in practical terms, independent, but which China laid claim to; not only the PRC but before it, the Republic of China also laid claim to it. Therefore, when a Tibetan delegation was invited to the Asian Relations Conference, which was held in 1947, the representative of the then Republic of China objected, saying how somebody could be invited from Tibet, which was not an independent country. So this question of the status of Tibet was already being talked about, whether or not we could treat it as an independent country. In 1950, China said there is no question of there being a kind of semi-independent Tibet because even the British earlier had said that China does not have sovereignty over Tibet but suzerainty over it. Now, suzerainty is something which goes back to the imperial age, and there is no concept of suzerainty as far as our modern-day world is concerned; you are either independent or you are not. This kind of halfway-house, where you have a formal claim over the territory but in actual practical terms you have to treat it as an independent country, could not work. More importantly, the question is whether or not India in any way could have prevented the Chinese from sending their troops into Tibet and beginning to exercise political control over it. We could not, since we simply did not have the military capacity. Since we are talking about a country which is at 15,000 ft general altitude, we did not have troops who were in a position to fight at such altitudes without being acclimatised for several months to it. So, that was not a practical alternative for us.

This was going to be a new situation that India would be facing a major power at its doorstep right after a history of not having to worry about this border at all because the Himalayas are almost like an impenetrable fortress. That changed in 1950. You should also realise that at that particular point in time there were kingdoms known as the Himalayan kingdoms such as Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim. They were also very much scared of what was happening across the border in Tibet since all these Himalayan states also had close linkages with Tibet historically. Now when the Chinese communist regime came into Tibet, there was also a sense of danger not only in India but also in these Himalayan states as to who they would look up to in order to safeguard their interests and security. Thus, they looked at India. So, the 1950 treaty between India and Nepal should also be seen in the context of that new kind of security landscape which emerged after the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and the invasion and control occupation of Tibet by China in 1950.

That was one very comprehensive answer. You answered my second question, which was something along the lines of the covert and overt operations that India is often criticised for leading in Nepal, with respect to terrorism and smuggling. Let me pose another such doubt—the Nepalese government claims that India is sending its Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) agents. Even the former Special Director, Amar Bhushan, in his book ‘Inside Nepal’ writes that the R&AW had launched a covert operation to bring down the monarchy in the 1990s with the story of Jeevanathan and Prachanda, who is having his third term in Nepal. So, do you think that India tries to interfere with Nepal?

I think I would want to caution you not to go by accounts written by retired officers who may have a certain view of how developments were taking place, or try to talk about their (exaggerated) role in some of these events.  I think we have to analyse, in a very dispassionate way, what the drivers of whatever development we are looking at are, and why such a development took place. It may make a very good story: chaps engaged in a cop-and-robbers kind of situation or a cloak-and-dagger thing, with somebody trying to make out what great operations they were carrying out. There may be no way of even verifying whether somebody was carrying out that operation. If there are really confidential operations, no government of India official is going to tell you if such an operation was carried out or not. I do not think that is a very productive way of analysing events as a political analyst. So, our main effort should be to try and see why India followed certain policies with respect to, say, Nepal, Bhutan, or with respect to China at a particular period of time.

Does India have a policy for Nepal? Since over time, we have seen that there has not been a singular policy that has been implemented with respect to Nepal.

For you to think there is one single policy that must be followed at all times and if that policy is not followed, India does not have any policy, that is a very superficial way to look at events. Policies evolve as the situation evolves. So to expect that India should be following just one particular policy with Nepal and it must not change it, and if it does it means  India does not have a policy towards Nepal, that is a very superficial way of analysing it.

This was a criticism that was done by Dr SD Muni in the Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy.

I am not here to answer what Dr Muni may have said. I am here to answer what concerns you may have and how you want to understand what India's policy with respect to Nepal or with China has been. I can try my best to explain to you from my perspective what that policy is and whether it made any sense. What you may be seeing as the inconsistencies of India's policy or you may be seeing certain gaps in India's policy, some of those are real. Not every country has the absolutely perfect kind of policies that it follows, and in many cases, when you are predicting something to happen, it does not happen. We are not  Superman who can decide what is the best policy to follow. 

If you take the example of Nepal, what is the reality is that it is part of India's security parameter and that if any hostile country manages to entrench itself in Nepal, then it has a serious security implication for India. Therefore, it is quite natural that India would be concerned about whatever developments are taking place in Nepal and what is the nature of Nepal's relationship with other external actors and if  those external actors are hostile to India or more benign with respect to India. So, the reason why Nepal is important to us should be quite obvious from the security point of view. Besides, we have an open border with Nepal, which means there are no restrictions; people can go back and forth without any kind of restriction. When you have an open border with that country, again, it should come as no surprise to you that we would be deeply concerned about any kind of terrorist activity or illegal activity which takes place through that border. Many of the policies that we follow take into account what the reality is with respect to that relationship.

Sir, let me get back to the Twelve-point Accord, where I think you also played an instrumental role.

If we are talking about the Twelve-point Accord, can you tell me the context within which it was agreed upon?

There was a ten-year-long struggle in Nepal. There were seven parties, and all of them held very different views on certain topics, and they required someone to negotiate on behalf of them to bring some of this struggle to an end. The revolution was being led by the Maoists, who had a very different agenda from other parties, and there was no consensus.

That is not the case. This is where I think it is important for you to understand the context within which such kinds of developments are taking place. You are right that there was a ten-year insurgency which was led by the Maosits who started in Western Nepal as a kind of a radical group really being driven by the very deep social and economic distress that the people of that region were going through, like in India the Naxalite movement began in tribal areas due to economic and social grievances of longstanding nature. Such grievances led to the development of this particular insurgency in Nepal, where the political process was not able to deliver to them the kind of relief the people were looking for. Therefore, the Maoists started off as a very small group, basically representing this kind of resentment in the local population but then it started growing to what it is now.

What was also around that time was a tussle taking place between the multiparty democracy and the monarchy. Mahendra had managed to establish a Panchayat democracy which was partyless and then you have Bindra coming in who continues the same process. Thereafter it was the Andolan in the 1990s where multi-party democracy came back and then you have what is known as the constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy—two pillars of the Nepali State. Thus, a certain space was being created again for political activity by political parties, and that process meant that there was a constant battle between the monarchy on the one side, which wanted to keep on asserting its own power, and the political parties on the other hand. It is true that the political parties, among themselves, had various kinds of tensions and disputes but at least on the aspect of multiparty democracy, they were more or less together. This was the time, as I said, when this Maoist insurgency started developing initially, not as a very big movement. If it had been controlled or addressed at that time itself, perhaps it would not have developed into a major insurgency.

But it got caught in a tussle between the monarchy and the political parties. The political parties wanted, for example, the Nepali army to help in curbing the insurgency. The King was not prepared to do that. The army was always under the King, despite the fact that this was a multi-party democracy. As far as the Royal Nepal Army was concerned, it was under the direct control of the monarchy itself.

So, he would not agree that the army could be used in order to deal with the security issue which had cropped up in western Nepal, thanks to the Maoists. Thus, what happened was that over a period of time, the insurgency started expanding further because there was no adequate response, and we came to a point where you have three players now. You have the political parties, the monarchy, and now a third player, the Maoists, who are becoming more and more influential. Now, the role that India played was, to begin with, recognising the danger that this insurgency posed to Nepal's security, which could also create complications for the simple reason that I mentioned why Nepal is so important to India in terms of security.

What would happen in Nepal would have an impact on India. Now, supposing you had this left-wing insurgency in Nepal, which started expanding in India, there was a fear that this could link up with the Naxalite movement. So you would have almost like what they used to call a ‘red corridor’ from the north to the south. Thus, there was a vested interest that India had in not allowing this insurgency to become even more powerful. So initially, for example, when I went as ambassador to Nepal, our effort was to try and convince the monarch, King Gyanendra, and the political parties that they should work together, because if they did not work together, then they could not handle the insurgency. India was prepared to help the Nepal state and the Nepali army with arms and training to try and deal with this insurgency, because it was also, as I mentioned to you, in our interests.

Now, the importance of the political parties and the monarch working together, we understood and tried to convey, but the monarch, Gyanendra, again felt that it was only a strong leader who could handle this challenge. So at times, he would even reach out to the Maoists and at times to the political parties. There was no consistent approach by him because he was trying to make sure that he was able to remain in power as a sole authority. Now, when it came to a point where he took over power entirely in his hands, that was February 2005, he had almost like a coup, and he took power and, in a sense, delegitimised all the political parties. That is where India had to make a choice whether we should go along with him or not. Some people felt here that it is only through him and the Nepali army that we could deal with this Maoist insurgency. There were others who felt that the King had overstepped. And it is for India to make certain that the Maoists and the political parties come together in order to resist this kind of grab of power by the King. So India did play a role in convincing the Maoists that they should abandon violent methods and join the multi-party democracy system as a political party, not as a revolutionary army. And if they are prepared to do that, then they can come together with the political parties so that they are able to resist and to frustrate the effort made on the part of the game to try and grab power in its entirety. That is the context in vision of the Twelve-point Accord.

Sir, I have a controversial and sensitive question that I would like to ask. I would like to get back to the context behind it. India has communist parties, and Mr Sitaram Yechury was also involved in many of his statements about what was happening in Nepal. He said that sending Dr Karan Singh as a special envoy to Nepal during this period was a wrong option because it was giving them mixed signals whether he was going there to defend democracy or monarchy, because he was quite close to King Gyanendra. So, what do you think of this criticism that was made by Mr Yechury?

See, again, you must take account of the situation within which the Government of India took a decision to send Dr Karan Singh. As I mentioned to you, the Twelve-point Accord has been concluded. At that particular time our effort was to try and convince the King that he should revert back to the role of a constitutional monarch; that is, he is there as a ceremonial head, like the British monarchies or as the president in another country may be, but not exercising active political authority and therefore, should accept the fact that his grab at power has not worked. The King had only succeeded in bringing both the Maoist and the political parties together. What India was prepared to do was to try and see that, at least, the King's status as a constitutional monarch was preserved, provided he accepted the principle of multi-party democracy, that political power should really be in the hands of the political parties who would conduct elections. Whoever emerges victorious in those elections will lead the country. 

So, Dr Karan Singh's role was limited to that aspect only, messaging to the King that his effort to try and keep power in his hands is not working, and he was going to be in danger, since he would be threatened because of the massive, popular mobilisation taking place. This is something because of which his survival may be affected. Thus, he should accept a role as a constitutional monarch and allow the multi-party democracy to be reestablished. How can anybody object to that?

There was another criticism that I would like you to throw light on. The Twelve-point Accord did not have any reference to the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty, and the parties and the leaders who came to power after that treaty actually criticised the accord and said that they would want some of the points to be withdrawn or updated. What do you think of it?

The Twelve-point program had nothing to do with India. The Twelve-point Accord was between the Maoists and the seven political parties. So, where does India become a part of it?

Point number ten actually mentions that Nepal tried to maintain cordial relationships with its neighbours, especially China and India.

So what is wrong with that? I mean, the point is that the Twelve-point program had nothing to do with India.

What you are trying to say, sir, is that it was only about Nepal, it did not have anything to do with India?

Yes, it had nothing to do with India, even though it was facilitated by India, certainly. India provided both the venue and the means for these parties to come together and conclude that accord.

Sir, I would like to bring something interesting for you. I would be reading a sort of poem that was actually recited in front of Mr MK Rasgotra when he was in Nepal. And, he thought of it as something that the people in Nepal had a popular opinion of.

It is a long poem, and it goes something like this:

And the rains and the floods come year after year, and the bridges go down, but these are not repaired, nor new ones erected.

Look southward beyond the hills, they are bridging the Ganga.

Oh God, give us a leader like Gandhi and a Raja like Nehru. 

This was a popular sentiment among the people of Western Nepal. During your time in Nepal, did you come across any such positive reaction in the people? What sort of sentiment did you come across in Nepal and the local people there?

Well, number one, you cannot generalise. It is not that the people of Nepal are one monolithic entity, and we know all of them have the same opinion. Different Nepalis have different opinions. Now, there is a certain elite opinion in the main Kathmandu Valley. They have a very strong sense of Nepal's own independent identity and of Nepal's sovereignty. They would like to maintain a certain balance in the relationship that we have with India and China. 

But at the same time, most Nepalis have very strong cultural and even family links with India. So even if we take the Nepali elite, for example, the Rana families, most of them get married in royal families here in India. So, why did Dr Karan Singh go to Nepal? His wife belonged to the Rana family in Nepal. Many of the royal families we have in India have connections with Nepal. Today in India, there are a very large number of Indians of Nepali origin. You take the example of Sikkim, which is almost entirely Nepali. You take Uttarakhand or Himachal, many of these states in India have very large populations of Nepali-origin people, but who are Indian citizens. They also have connections across the border. There are people from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh who have very strong connections and family links with the Madhesis on the other side. So, the density of people-to-people relationships which exist between India and Nepal is unprecedented. They do not have a parallel anywhere. Even though we are two independent countries, people's connection is very, very strong. Similarly, there are religious linkages and cultural linkages.

As far as the general sort of sentiment towards India is concerned, it is one of very close affinity. That does not mean that some people are not very angry about something which happens in India, or Indians do not get angry about something which is happening in Nepal, but generally speaking, there is a very strong connection. Also, until recently, we had a very large number of Nepalis serving in the Indian Army. Now, many of those people who retire go back to Nepal and settle in various villages. They still retain a very strong connection and affinity with the Indian Army. So, as far as the people-to-people relationship is concerned, it is very strong, and I would say, mostly very positive.

What do you think is the way ahead for India to deal with Nepal, given the PRC is planning on building some infrastructure projects that will not go well with India? So, how do you think we would be tackling these issues when the Chinese traders and businessmen come closer to our borders? How would India react to it?

India is already reacting to it. India has to present itself as a much better partner than China can. Every country will try to do that. We also do balancing. If Nepal or any of our neighbouring countries tries to balance what it considers the danger of domination by India, by reaching out to other countries, it is quite normal.

So this will not end, according to you?

The thing is about what you are able to do to be the partner of choice for any of your neighbours. If you are able to show your neighbours that their interests are actually much better served by having a strong relationship with India, then you do not have to worry.

Moving to the second part, which is about the Indian Foreign Service. How appropriate do you think the current selection process of people, students, or interested people into the Foreign Services is? Because all of them go through the same procedure, and we are seeing that there is a certain criticism that we should be recruiting the officers in the IFS through a very different procedure. What is your take on this?

Well, the question is whether or not the people whom we are already recruiting through the current civil service examination process are working well. I have not seen any particular criticism that the people who are coming through this process are not really qualified to serve as Foreign Service officers. If somebody can point out to me what the downside to that is, then we can consider what is the alternative way of recruiting people. But I would say, that, as far as my experience has been in the Foreign Service, the people whom we have recruited through the civil service examination process, like in any other service, are both: some people who are very good and maybe some people who are not very well suited for this. That is something which happens. Much more important is the kind of training process you have. What kind of capacity building do you do? How do you train them to be good diplomats? That is far more important than just who you have brought in.

Sir, during your time as a diplomat, you must have come across a lot of politicians and senior leaders across the world. Did you come across any particular person whose view, you think, is quite contrary to the popular opinion held by the masses? Is there any such politician or a certain head of country that you met?

The thing is that people with whom I have come in contact as part of my career, I have had good experiences, and I may have had some bad experiences, but that is again quite normal. So, I have had heads of missions with whom I have got along very well. I have served with prime ministers like Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee-ji, and Manmohan Singh. I have had great respect for these leaders, and I found them very statesman-like in their approach. And for me, it has been a great and privileged experience working together with them. So, I have not had an experience which I can point to and say, this person was like the popular perception of him.

Perhaps you can save it for your autobiography.

Well, we come across different people in our careers. Diplomacy is all about human relations because ultimately everything is about how you interact with your counterparts and how you interact with people you come in contact with. It is all about engagement and communication. So, in that respect, I think I would rate my experience in the Foreign Service as being very positive.

Sir, the last question I would like to ask you would be—do you think there is anything that you could have done differently as an Indian Foreign Service officer? Something that could have altered, say, a certain policy that India has currently? Or let me rephrase that to ask, do you hold any regrets about any decision?

Well, number one, you must realise that decisions that are taken by me as an individual are not my decisions. I mean, there is a system. So, whatever policy I may have been implementing with respect to the party is not my policy.

Let me frame that better. Do you think that there was a certain time when your personal opinion was different from the official standard?

Yes, that is very normal because the job of a civil servant, whether he is from the Indian Administrative Service or whether he is from the Foreign Service, is to present to the political leadership advice and options which, in my best professional opinion, I want to keep. Supposing I want a certain policy line to be followed. Now, I cannot personally follow that policy line unless it is a decision which is also endorsed by the political leadership. There have been occasions where what I felt should be done was not accepted by the political leadership. Now, in that situation, as a professional civil servant, I have to accept that even though my advice is not accepted, I, as a civil servant, have to carry out the decision that has been taken.

Right, sir. Let us say that you hold a strong opinion on something. Were you, as a foreign secretary or an ambassador, allowed to keep it in front of the foreign minister or the person who was in charge of affairs?

I have never had an occasion where I have not been able to express my frank opinion or give frank advice on any particular issue. There has never been an issue where I would be scared that the foreign minister's view may be different, and therefore, I should be concerned.

Is the Government of India quite open with it?

At least my experience has been quite open. We have had the Cabinet Committee on Security, which sits down and discusses important security-related issues or foreign policy-related issues. Now, in those internal debates that we have, it is not necessary that my view is accepted by the rest of these people. Since I have a certain kind of perspective, and I am putting forward my perspective to the best of my knowledge and whatever professional experience I have, I am trying to give advice based on that. Now, the Prime Minister has many other considerations. He is not looking narrowly at the foreign policy aspect that I am pressing for. He has to think about, for example, what the domestic consequences would be and about the larger issue in terms of the relationship, perhaps, with other major issues

So, there is a difference of perspective.

Yes. There would be occasions where he would accept what I am trying to put across. The Prime Minister says you have the professional experience and insight because you have served in that country or because you have served in the foreign ministry; therefore, you have a certain advantage in giving advice. Therefore, the advice may be accepted in some cases and in other cases, it may not. So, you, as a professional civil servant, have to accept that there will be occasions where what you are presenting as your advice or opinion may be accepted, and in other cases may not be accepted. And the bottom line is that, having given your advice, you have to carry out whatever the decision finally taken by the political leadership, even if it does not conform to what you may have advised.

Ends.