As published in the Volume 2(1) of Ramjas Political Review
Abstract
This essay aims to study the patterns and evolution of political polarisation in two democracies – the USA and India. Political polarisation can be considered as a form of an extreme ideological divide (generally) between two factions or (the left and the right-wing) political parties, which may lead to a feeling of hostility for the other. This essay traces the recent history of political polarisation in both countries and describes its current status through data and academic research available on the topic. Moreover, the bifurcation between the ideological and affective polarisation has been highlighted while stating their respective roles in the polarisation of the public.
The essay also explores the concepts of civic culture and social capital, while highlighting their versatile significance in a democratic society. Through a detailed study of the two cases, with the help of various academic sources and research data, the impact of political polarisation on civic culture and social capital has been elucidated, indicating how it may directly or indirectly cause democratic backsliding. To conclude, a few recommendations have been mentioned based on the research and data, to reduce political polarisation and thereby, its impact on society.
Keywords: Political polarisation, Social Capital, Civic Culture, Democracy.
Introduction
The former United States (US) President and the present Republican candidate, Donald Trump was shot on the 13th of July, 2024 during a campaign rally. What, fortunately, was a failed assassination attempt spoke even more severe truths about modern democracies, which demand our strict attention. Although this is the latest of such attacks against politicians, it is certainly not the sole one. The world has seen various violent attacks on politicians for decades, if not centuries; some of these being the murder of Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978, and the assassinations of the former Indian prime ministers Indira Gandhi in 1984 and Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in 1995. The list of such politically motivated violent acts in the recent past includes the assassinations of Shinzo Abe, the former Prime Minister of Japan in 2022, Walter Lübcke, a German conservative politician in 2019, and a severe attack on the Slovakian prime minister, Robert Fico, earlier this year. Growing polarisation and political intolerance within democracies is deemed to be a grave concern for this escalating trend of political violence.
While the above instances are stated to showcase the gravity of the subject, this essay does not aim to put its entire focus on such violent acts, but to explain some of their underlying factors. This essay focuses on democracies in general and the United States of America and India, in particular. Although the data available on political polarisation in India is not as rigorous as that available for the USA, this essay aims to analyse and note the characteristics of polarisation as observed in the two nations. Additionally, the study aims to understand the symbiotic relationship between civic culture and social capital in a democracy and how they are impacted in a polarised political system. Thus, it tries to understand certain foundational features which are adversely impacted by polarisation and extremist politics, and how they can, sometimes, lead to political violence.
Understanding Political Polarisation
According to Sartori (1976, p.135), “ideological distance” is a defining characteristic of polarisation. Political polarisation can be considered as a form of an extreme ideological divide (generally) between two factions or (the left and the right-wing) political parties, which may lead to a feeling of hostility for the other. Thus, a polarised political environment is marked by significant divergence in political attitudes, often leading to a stark division between political parties, groups or ideologies.
Political polarisation is a threat to democracies around the world because of both – the processes it involves and the implications it has. Some of the threats include predisposing the society to gradual executive takeovers through democratically elected officers (Svolik, 2019); gridlock and ineffective governance; social unrest and hostility towards opposing ideological groups, etc; these factors lead to democratic backsliding (see also Svolik, 2019). Since the only major benefit of ‘healthy’ polarisation is that it provides distinct alternatives to the public in democracies, this essay focuses on the dystopian image of the same. Moving forward, the essay aims to analyse political polarisation in the USA and India and their impacts on the civic culture and social capital, which form the fundamentals of a democratic system.
Civic Culture and Social Capital
In their seminal work, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (1963), political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba define civic culture as a political culture characterised by "a balanced mixture of participant, subject, and parochial political orientations." According to Almond and Verba, civic culture is a very significant factor for democratic stability, effective governance, and conflict resolution in a country.
However, there are many debates regarding the role of civic culture as either a cause or effect of democracy. Thinkers like Almond and Verba (1963), and Inglehart (1988, 1990) hypothesised that cultural attitudes like balanced engagement, political efficacy, and trust in institutions are crucial prerequisites for a stable democracy. However, critics and thinkers like Edward N Muller and Mitchell A Seligson present a contrasting view. They postulate that civic culture can be considered an effect of the democratic political system and the “successful persistence of democracy over time is likely to increase in levels of civic culture attitudes” (Muller & Seligson, 1994). In other words, a democracy should further reinforce such qualities and sustain public trust in governmental institutions and with each other. Thus, it is a case of circular causality where civic culture attitudes could be considered both – a cause (Almond & Verba, 1963) and an effect of democratic societies (Muller & Seligson, 1994). In either case, the civic culture of a democracy is impacted through the processes brought about by political polarisation. Being a causal factor of democracy, the impact on civic culture may endanger the foundations of such a society; being one of the outcomes of democracy, it becomes vulnerable to various alterations in public attitude towards politics.
Another concept of importance in the study of democratic systems is social capital. Social capital refers to the networks of relationships among people who live and work in a particular society, enabling that society to function effectively (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, n.d.). It includes the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from these networks. James Coleman (1988), who highlighted the functional aspects of social capital in creating human capital, postulated that certain features of social capital, such as trust, interconnected networks, norms, and obligations, led to social facilitation and cooperation.
Social capital is vital for the functioning of democracy. It further fosters civic engagement, as individuals are more likely to engage in political processes when they feel connected to their community and trust their fellow citizens and institutions (Putnam, 2000). Social capital fosters trust in institutions, which is essential for democratic stability and the effective functioning of government (Fukuyama, 1995). Moreover, high social capital promotes accountability and good governance, as a well-connected citizenry can more effectively monitor and influence government actions (Coleman, 1988). Robert Putnam et al. (1993) postulated that regions with higher levels of social capital exhibit stronger adherence to democratic norms such as tolerance and reciprocity. Thus, one can observe the multiple strands or explanations of social capital, each leading to a similar conclusion: its immense yet mundane significance in the stability of a democratic system. It is quite integral to understand these notions of civic culture and social capital, as these principles are quietly affected by political polarisation and can lead to the undermining of democracy.
Political Polarisation in the United States of America
What is considered to be the symbol of democratic ideals, at least since the Cold War, the US has faced intense political polarisation since the past. Currently too, the 2024 presidential elections in America are looming on the surface and it has already proved to be one of the most intense electoral battles the country has seen in the post-Cold War era. A few weeks ago, on 13 July, Donald Trump, a former President and the Republican candidate, was attacked during an electoral campaign in Butler County, Pennsylvania. This failed assassination attempt further added fuel to the already heated electoral divide in the US. Although the attacker’s specific motive still remains a mystery (Mallin et al, 2024), this act of violence has spurred conversations about the polarised climate of the country and has indeed led to an upsurge in conspiracy theories and scepticism which has deepened the political divide (Rhodes, 2024). The following section of the essay explains the brief history of political polarisation in the US and tries to trace its evolution through the decades.
Ideological Elite Polarisation to Affective Mass Polarisation: An Overview
The political polarisation in America as observed today has taken shape through the gradually incrementing ideological divide and changes in the political attitudes in the country. It started in a rather common way, a way through which politics generally gets polarised in many nations – through the formation of a clear division of political parties on ideological lines. In the case of America, it began after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which set in motion the sorting of parties based on ideologies (Kleinfeld, 2023). This political cleavage further led to a full-fledged divide in ideologies based on the views of the politicians on significant national and social issues, for instance, the Vietnam War and the rights of women, the LGBTQ+ community, and environmental concerns.
Polarisation can be categorised on the basis of its range or focus into elite and mass polarisation. Elite polarisation restricts itself to the polarisation of the political parties (generally into two extremes), while mass polarisation divides the common populace based on political preferences and ideas. Rachel Kleinfield (2023) excellently compiles and analyses different statistics about polarisation in the US. She highlights polarisation initially manifested itself in the form of ideological elite polarisation. This refers to the gradual practice of sorting political parties on ideological lines starting from the 1970s, as stated above, and which culminated in clear distinctions between the Republicans and the Democrats. Data by the Pew Research Centre shows that both sections grew ideologically apart, moving away from the centre in opposite directions, rendering the democrats more liberal, while the republicans became more conservative (DeSilver, last updated 2022). As a result, “(they) are farther apart ideologically today than at any time in the past 50 years” (DeSilver, 2022). This was accompanied by a growing sense of antipathy towards the opposing party politicians and supporters which was seeping into the common populace.
Although polarisation, in its early phases, restricted itself to the political parties and leaders of the Republican and Democratic parties; however, currently America observes an expansion of such polarising attitudes among the public as well, which Kleinfeld refers to as “affective mass polarisation” (2023). Mass polarisation, as is clear from its name, refers to the polarisation of society and not just the formal political actors (Geçer, 2023, p. 182); affective mass polarisation refers to the concept of polarisation among the public on emotional bases rather than ideological ones. It refers to the phenomenon where individuals in a society start to increasingly dislike or even feel hostility towards the members of the opposing political party or group. The American public started to internalise the identities of their preferred party and grew a sense of attachment towards it; however, many times, it relates more to the feeling of antipathy towards the other party than the liking towards one’s own (Kleinfeld, 2023).
Affective mass polarisation can prove to be a curious case of socio-psychological study since partisans, out of sheer apprehension towards the other party, may refuse to collaborate even when their priorities and concerns are alike. This generally happens due to misconceptions. Moreover, it was not the ideological polarisation that proved to be a threat to democracy; rather, it was the affective one, led by emotions and identity politics, that made for a subtle darkness over American democracy. Thus, mass effective polarisation can lead to social fragmentation and erosion of democratic norms as discussed later in the essay.
Political Polarisation in India
As Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue (2019) put it “(Polarisation) is not just an American illness; it is a global one.” However, the academic research and statistics available online are heavily focused on Western democracies (Puthran, n.d.). Hence, the analysis of political polarisation in India presented in this essay would not be as thorough as for the US.
Although political polarisation in India is a prevalent concept, it has been re-moulded many times according to the changing political climate of the nation. In the newborn Indian democracy of the 1950s, the Indian National Congress (INC) inherited the legacy of the national movement and enjoyed a hegemonic power in Indian politics against a fragmented opposition. The Nehruvian era of Indian politics garnered stable and popular support for the INC by the public. This era of ‘single-party dominance’ was strategically played out through functional elements like the maintenance of plurality within the party which provided diverse representation of views, checked factionalism, and internal and external margin of pressures as explained by Rajni Kothari (1964). However, the seed of political polarisation had been sown when Indira Gandhi, the former PM of India declared the infamous Emergency in 1975, following which the party faced, for the first time, public scrutiny and lost support (Rai, 2022). The 1977 general election shook the, once invincible, Congress with ‘Anti-Congressism’, which saw the formation of a united opposing alliance incorporating ideologically distinct groups. Thus, it caused a divergence of votes under the labels of ‘Congress-supporting’ and ‘Congress-opposing,’ respectively, causing the end of the Congress system with the Janata Party forming the government. This later also gave way to a wave of coalition politics in India which lasted for a few decades till 2014. Certainly, this polarisation could not be considered exclusively as ‘ideological’ since it did not involve rigid ideological segregation and led to partisan politics and group formations.
Polarisation took a leap in 2014 and 2019 and has been gradually increasing since. 2014 saw a landslide victory for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which secured 282 seats in the general elections. This verdict also marked the historic replacement of the already-ended ‘Congress-System’ (which secured only 44 seats) with the ‘BJP-System’ (Maiorano et al., 2020) since the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) has secured victory for three consecutive terms since then, the latest being in the 2024 general elections.
Even though the 77-year-old democracy comprises multiple parties, politics has simultaneously become more polarised, with the latest general elections assumed to be one of the most polarised in the post-independence period. Affective polarisation in India in the last decade has observed more emphasis on identity politics rather than party politics; the groups are categorised by Prarthna Puthran (n.d.) as ‘Modi supporters’ and ‘Modi opposers’. The interviews conducted in the study showed how the people are “passionate” about Prime Minister Modi and how his identity plays a significant role in forming opinions about his party and its opponents. This categorisation also played a remarkable role in the 2024 general elections. However, the election saw a significant counterbalance through the desperate efforts of the India National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA) led by the Congress Party, which effectively challenged this trajectory. Various political parties came under a single umbrella to form the INDIA and proved to be a strong opponent to the BJP, which could secure only 240 seats (The Hindu, 2024), down from 303 in 2019 (Dale & Jeavans, 2019), and thus, failed to form the majority government by itself, and thus, it has proved to a turbulence in the party’s decade-long dominance. Nevertheless, the NDA did manage to assume office, making PM Narendra Modi only the second prime minister to win a third consecutive term in the history of the modern Republic of India.
Affective polarisation along with negative partisanship is becoming a common social phenomenon in Indian politics (Barthwal & Jensenius, 2024). Partisan loyalists have shown stability in their opinions, according to a report (Barthwal & Jensenius, 2024). A survey conducted by Sharanya Hrishikesh and Vikas Pandey (BBC, 2024) explained instances of how some people, irrespective of their satisfaction with the level of progress, showed strong admiration for PM Modi.
However, political polarisation is a multi-faceted concept, especially in a country as diverse as the largest democracy, involving the study of social concepts. A more informed understanding of the situation requires more empirical data and studies conducted in the field.
Causes of Affective Polarisation in Both Countries
This section aims to highlight some common causes that led to political polarisation in India and the US.
Firstly, affective polarisation includes heavy sorting of political and partisan identities. Kleinfeld (2023) explains that the identification of people with extreme political positions and the forming of an in-group and an out-group categorisation leads to the overestimation of the opponent’s threats and a sense of protection towards the in-group. This can be explained as a mentality of “Us versus Them”. For instance, this was also visible in Donald Trump’s electoral campaigns in 2016, which involved the rhetoric of “‘Us’ – the ‘real’ Americans… and ‘Them’ – ‘the immigrants and minorities’” (Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019). Rhetorics in India also seem to create a partisan divide, especially among the loyal supporters.
Secondly, partisan media and social media play a major role by creating echo chambers and media bubbles (Kleinfeld, 2023) in both the US and India. The problem of social media in polarising the masses is overemphasised while underestimating the effective role played by other media outlets; however, it is not the case because, firstly, the Internet only came into use in the 2000s; it does not explain the polarisation trend that started two decades earlier in the US; secondly, affective polarisation seemed to be growing much faster in people aged more than sixty-five years, who spent more time watching news on the television than on the Internet (Kleinfeld, 2023). Social media and other forms of media in India have also been awarded a major part in electoral campaigns and for spreading political views. WhatsApp, having a base of 400 million active Indian users, has also provided a lucrative platform for political parties and partisan groups (Joshi, 2024). Subsequently, it has become a channel of spreading disinformation and hate speech (Joshi, 2024). This is the reason why the company has limited the number of people or groups a person can share a message to, at one time, to five. This measure was taken to ensure people recheck the facts before forwarding something, and to at least make the job of spreading misinformation more difficult (Chitra, 2018). Thirdly, the geographic placement of the in-group members near each other even incidentally predisposes them to similar ideas, which strengthens such ideas. The process of socialisation with other in-group members may lead to the psychological concept known as the bandwagon effect, which “refers to the tendency of people to adopt certain behaviours, styles, or attitudes simply because everyone else is doing it” (Cherry, 2023).
Nolan McCarty, Keith T Poole, and Howard Rosenthal in their seminal report “Political Polarisation and Income Inequality” (2003) establish a correlation between ideological polarisation and income inequality. However, there is a much less established correlation between economic factors and affective polarisation due to a lack of studies in the field (Kleinfeld, 2023). Social factors related to race, caste, and religion can lead to political divides. According to a report by DW Davis and Wilson, “racial resentment is a powerful underlying force in polarisation” in the US (Lempinen, 2024). Due to a much more expansive meaning of the term “religion” in India than in the West (Verghese as cited in O’Reilly, 2022), religion, along with caste, inevitably gets involved in the political question. For instance, the BJP has been associated with promoting a Hindu-centric narrative, while the Samajwadi Party’s (SP) ideology of socialism has been centred around caste. The INC had also presented various caste-based elements and schemes in their manifesto for the recent general elections (Indian National Congress, 2024). Rahul Gandhi’s slogan “Jitni Aabadi, Utna Haq” (offering rights proportionate to communities’ population) was also criticised by the opposing leaders (Manoj, 2023).
One of the most influential causes of mass polarisation would be the strategies used by politicians, such as negative campaigning and providing political incentives (Kleinfeld, 2023). Populist leaders and leader-based electoral campaigns seem to have become commonplace in America and India. Even during the ongoing electoral campaigns, negative campaigning has become the norm; recently in a speech, Donald Trump called Kamala Harris, the Democratic candidate, a “radical left lunatic,” targeting her and President Joe Biden over illegal immigration and crime, while she claimed that these were “wild lies” (Hindustan Times, 2024). Even the Indian election campaigns earlier this year saw the prominence of leader-based campaigns and targeting comments by both the contesting alliances – the NDA and the INDIA.
Impact of Affective Mass Polarisation on Civic Culture and Social Capital
After the assassination attempt on Trump, it was quite evident that political rivalry was no longer limited to debates and discussions among the politicians, rather that it had entered the public arena and was taking the shape of violent extremism. In fact, even the politicians have realised that the political climate of the nation has heated up and as said by the US President Biden, “it is time to cool it down” (Reid et al., 2024). Mass affective polarisation, characterised by deep-seated emotional hostility and distrust between political groups, has significant and detrimental impacts on civic culture and social capital in democracies.
Firstly, it diminishes the quality of public discourse. Conversations are marked by hostility and personal attacks. This leads to a lack of constructive arguments as there is reduced tolerance for dissent. According to de Tocqueville, as explained by JL Sullivan and JE Transue (1999), tolerance is one of the prerequisites of democracy and the people must at least be open to “put up” with opposing arguments. Growing intolerance results from heightened threat perceptions of the opponent (outgroup) (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Hence, growing intolerance among the public leads to a decline in pluralistic views and subsequently the democratic spirit, as one might say.
Secondly, it raises the question of civic engagement. Civic engagement manifests in various forms in a democracy: public participation, community involvement, and public advocacy are some of them. Analysis of public participation through voting and running for office shows whether polarisation has enhanced or diminished public willingness to directly engage with politics. However, polarisation may not have a linear impact on voter turnout; since voter turnout has increased in the US (Hartig et al., 2022), while decreased in India from 67.4 per cent in 2019 to 65.79 per cent in 2024 (Election Commission of India, 2024, p.1). Furthermore, many other points may be attributed to the voter turnout, making it difficult to explain the correlation.
Thirdly, polarisation can socially fragment society. As people withdraw into like-minded groups, they may become less likely to participate in broader civic activities. The sense of shared community purpose diminishes, weakening the collective civic culture. Moreover, political opinions and preferences seem to guide one’s daily life in a highly polarised society. For instance, as mentioned in the study by Iyengar and Westwood (2015), the partisan task required the members to choose the better candidate based on their resume and political leaning; the results depicted that approximately 80 per cent of the partisans chose their in-party candidate.
Fourthly, individuals exposed to partisan media and social influences may feel compelled to conform to dominant group opinions. Instead of critically evaluating information, they may seek conclusions that reinforce in-group loyalty (Jilani & Smith, 2019). This can stifle diverse political expression. Mass polarisation deteriorates social capital as partisans may not want to collaborate even on common issues due to a lack of understanding and misconceptions. This may adversely affect community behaviour and understanding.
Almond and Verba (1963) argue that a balanced civic culture, incorporating parochial, participant, and subject cultures, is essential. However, in a polarised society, there may be an overemphasis on participant or subject cultures at the expense of parochial culture. Conversely, a lack of awareness of rising polarisation could increase parochialism.
Extreme and excessive affective polarisation can lead to offensive public behaviour like hate speech and violence. This stems out of heightened intolerance towards opposing views. Furthermore, negative partisanship and antipathy towards an opponent party or leader would lead to an increase in overall tensions and targeted violence. Especially in the US, political violence is on the rise (see also Kleinfeld, 2021) and observed together with popular attitudes and gun culture, it proves to be a threat to democracy.
Lastly, polarisation may also lead to a reduction in interpersonal trust and trust in institutions. As polarisation creates stark divisions in society, it limits inter-group discussions which fosters stereotypes and prejudices. Furthermore, legislative gridlock and the unaccountable attitude of governmental institutions leads to a lack of trust in them.
Conclusion
The essay begins by understanding the concepts of civic culture and social capital and how they relate to the proper functioning of democracies. Civic culture and social capital work together and form the fundamentals of a democracy. Many democracies of the world are observing heightened polarisation due to various factors. The analysis includes case studies of the United States and India, drawing parallels between the characteristics and evolution of political polarisation in these democracies. The essay identifies common causal factors of polarisation and explores its effects on civic culture and social capital, which, if unchecked, can lead to democratic backsliding.
Some of the ways to address increasing polarisation in the two countries and democracies, in general, would include increased constructive dialogue between the polarised parties and groups. This would foster understanding and collaboration while breaking misconceptions. Inter-group interactions in social settings over common interests can be purposeful in decreasing polarisation. Improved media literacy can help individuals evaluate and fact-check biassed content rather than believe it blankly. A crucial point put forward by Kleinfeld (2023) is to emphasise the salience of a shared identity, i.e., the identity of a citizen of a country. This must be considered the foremost identity instead of the adopted partisan one. Civic education regarding democratic norms and public harmony can be useful to mitigate affective polarisation by adopting a ‘bottom-up’ approach.
Furthermore, more research on the correlation between the causes and consequences of affective polarisation would lead to more refined findings. Region-specific data of big democracies like India and the USA would also help cater to specific concerns related to polarisation in the two countries.
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The author, Arshita Chopra, is a student at Ramjas College, University of Delhi.
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