As published in the Volume 2(1) of Ramjas Political Review
Abstract
In the Arthasastra, there is no divine theory of kingship. Since the king is not divine, VR Mehta assumes that he has a free hand in the use of political power (danda). However, Adam Watson notes that the goal of Arthasastra is to secure the happiness (sukham) of the people [as Kautilya aligns the ends of both the king and the subjects], which RP Kangle says, is possible only through transcending anarchy via the principled application of danda (power) on artha (the land where humans dwell and seek happiness). This not only makes danda a means to acquire the dharmic end of sukham, but the principled application of danda is necessitated by dharma – or dharma begets and restrains danda. But in the absence of an ordinance of divinity, what makes a king tread the path of dharma? I argue that Kautilya synthesised both Aristotelian and Socratic maxims on moral excellence to create an indirect check on the exercise of danda – through habit (practising self-regulation) and knowledge of the good (through the study of Puranas, epics, and Vedic texts).
Keywords: Dharma, Danda, happiness, Kautilya, Arthasastra
“The Indian tradition of strategic thought emphasised the concept of dharma – a set of rules that bound the ruler and the ruled alike. Also, Indian concepts of statecraft had strong moral and ethical undertones in contrast to contemporary realist emphasis on aggregate power and material factors.”
Gupta and Holtsmark (2014, p. x.)
The Prelude: Absence of a Divine Contract
Let me begin this paper with verses 1.13.5-7 of the Arthasastra:
“When people were oppressed by matsyanyaya (anarchy), they made Manu, the son of Vivasvat, the king. They fixed one-sixth part of the grains and one-tenth of their goods and money [as] his share. Kings who receive this share [must be] able to secure the well-being of [their] subjects.”
We can make a compelling observation here – there is no divine theory of kingship in Arthasastra. Kangle (1997, p. 116) calls the above verses “[a] contract for the establishment of monarchy.” In the absence of a divine sanction above the king, the result could be royal power or danda, having what Ghokale (1966, p. 16) called “the calamitous potential of a conflagration or a flood.”
It may be noted that in the later stages, dhammachakka (spiritual power) and anachakka (temporal power) in the Buddhist theory of kingship were synthesised into a single figure of the dhammiko dhammaraja, who ruled according to dhamma. Therefore, even in the Buddhist traditions, the check on wanton use of royal power was that of equating the ruler with the Bodhisattva, which is clearly absent in the Kautilyan paradigm. Taking this into consideration, Mehta (1992, p. 92) argues:
“Since Kautilya often confused the preservation of the state with the preservation of the king, he virtually gave a blank check to the princes to commit all sorts of atrocities.”
So, is there no check on danda (political power) in Arthasastra?
I disagree.
We may note that in the latter part of the verse quoted above [v. 1.13.5-7], ensuring the well-being of the citizens is established as the dharma of the king. This, PK Gautam (2016, p. 7) interprets as “political virtue or ethical and moral issues in statecraft”. Thus, as I will elaborate upon further, the dharma of the king or the rajdharma in the Arthasastra has two components – one, it is the source of danda (political power); and two, it is something that necessitates the principled use of danda.
Along similar lines, Vivekananda (2011, p. 89) writes:
“Since kingship in the Arthasastra was not concerned with divinity, the power to [censure and to] wage war was released from the logic of dharma and the attended duties of the virtuous king.”
By this, Vivekananda is suggesting that the power to wage war and to use danda emanates from rajdharma, and in consonance with the aforesaid – rajdharma regulates the power of danda, as danda shall be directed to the well-being of the people.
Dharma Begets and Restrains Danda
For Watson (2009), the goal of human life, according to Kautilya, is happiness – the happiness of the people. He remarks:
“It is curious that from the Arthasastra to the American Declaration of Independence, no other texts put the pursuit of happiness quite high.”
However, there is no happiness in anarchy, where matsyanyaya (anarchy) prevails. Aristotle maintains that happiness – which is the pleasure of one’s ‘higher faculties’ – can be attained only when the needs of the ‘lower faculties’, including nutrition and security, are met. In other words, (hu)man can aspire for happiness only when there is security. Thus, it is the prime duty of the king, according to Kangle (1997, p. 120), to annihilate anarchy through the “principled use of danda on artha” (the land where people reside, and seek happiness by productively utilising it), thereby creating positive conditions for people to be happy.
It is worth noting, however, that Kautilya allows for danda in such a proportion as necessary to transcend anarchy to create conditions for people to be happy. Thus, the corollary would be that unrestrained use of danda would defeat its very purpose. As professed by Chakravarty (1992, p. 333):
“The king was given [the] authority of coercion (danda) and for awarding punishment to the wicked. But, Kautilya holds that unlimited coercive authority would defeat its very purpose and lead once again to matsyanyaya.”
But how does the unrestrained application of danda engender anarchy? As I mentioned before, Kautilyan monarchy is the result of a social contract – thus, is a means to achieve the end of happiness (where the king creates conditions for the people to be happy through transcending anarchy via the just application of danda on artha) – and if the end is jeopardised, the raison d'être of the contract crumbles. People exit the contract as its utility is defeated – and the society will be thrown back to square one – that of anarchy. As Kangle (1997, p. 120) says:
“An unjust or improper use of this power by the ruler might lead to serious consequences, the most serious being a revolt or kopa of the subjects against the ruler… The threat of prakritikopa or a revolt of the people is expected to serve as a check on the wanton use of his coercive power by the ruler.”
Thus, in the Kautilyan paradigm, the ruler is bound by rajdharma to secure the happiness of his subjects. However, as argued by Kangle (1997), it is possible only through the principled use of danda, to augment artha, and make it conducive for human happiness. Therefore, as Mehta (1992, p. 87) notes, the power to use danda, “which represents the coercive power of the state”, was not unhitched, but emanated from rajdharma [as the duty of the king to ensure the happiness of his subjects necessitates the use of danda to tame anarchy and make artha conducive for human happiness – thus, dharma begets danda], and was restrained by it [as the use of danda shall be principled, insofar as it augments artha or tames anarchy to secure sukham].
Thus, the restrained use of danda is not only the product of the looming threat of anarchy, which, for Kautilya is “worse than the highest tyranny” (Mehta, 1992, p. 84), but the principled use of force (danda) is necessitated by dharma. The king, bound by the rajdharma, is expected to direct the force of danda towards ensuring that the subjects are happy. Drekmeier (1962, p.10) affirms:
“…Though dharma depends on danda, dharma is the higher power. The rajdharma, the dharma of the king, exists as guarantor of the whole social structure. Danda is the means, and dharma, the end.”
Thus, it is the duty of the king to use danda as a means to achieve the ends of dharma – and in the Kautilyan sense, this dharmic end is happiness (sukham) – which is not only limited to the happiness derived from enjoying material gain, but a “triad of gains – mental, material, and spiritual” (Arthasastra, v. 9.7.60).
Therefore, Kautilya’s idea of danda is noteworthy in at least two ways. One, it is only through the principled application of danda that the right conditions can be cultivated so that people can be happy, which is the end of statecraft – thus, danda is the means to achieve the end of statecraft. And two, the use of danda is restricted by its very purpose, i.e., to make people happy (Mukherjee, 1985, p.23).
Happiness of the King or Happiness of the People?
Till now, I worked on the concept of danda with an assumption that the end of statecraft in Arthasastra is the happiness of the people. However, as Kangle (1997, p. 128) rightfully notes, Kautilya talks about the happiness of the ‘state’. He also mentions that Kautilya often used ‘state’ as a pun – alluding to both the king and the state. So, if the state is the king, is artha the personal tool of the sovereign to secure his happiness?
For Machiavelli, the end of statecraft was mantenere lo stato, or the maintenance of the state (or the Prince – as Machiavelli also used ‘state’ as a pun to mean both the state and the prince). He mentions en passant in the Discourses, that ‘what benefits the Prince, harms the city’, implying that the ends of both the Prince and the people are different.
So, as Mehta (1992, p. 92) says, is danda a “blank cheque” given to the king to advance his ends?
I beg to differ.
For Rousseau (Rousseau, as cited in Rawls, 2007, p. 223), justice (and morality) springs out of the ‘general will’ – the summation of the ‘real will’ of individuals, who submit “their person and all their power in common under the supreme direction of the general will” – or in other words, the will of people who have aligned their ends with the ends of all, thus, creating a “body … [where] each member [is] an indivisible part of the whole”. This is morality, thus virtue, according to Immanuel Kant (1993, p. 44), who summarises the same in his third categorical imperative – “Act according to maxims of a universally legislating member of a merely possible kingdom of ends.”
Kautilya attempts exactly to create this ‘kingdom of ends’ by aligning the ends of the king with the ends of the subjects. He says (Arthasastra, v. 1.19.34):
“In the happiness of the subjects lies the happiness of the king, and what is beneficial to the subjects, his own benefit. What is dear to himself is not beneficial to the king, but what is dear to the subjects is beneficial to him.”
Drawing upon the same, Sihag (2016, p. 134) says:
“Kautilya’s approach is people-centric, and comparing it to Machiavelli’s king-centric approach shows ignorance about his work.”
Therefore, Kautilya propounds an ethics-centric approach to statecraft, rather than an approach based on the self-interest of the ruler, as Machiavelli came up with. He locates the “happiness of the king” in the “happiness of the subjects” (Arthasastra, v. 1.19.34), making the Kautilyan paradigm grounded in ethics and morality of statecraft.
Therefore, there is no morality suited to statecraft – statecraft, aspiring for sukham (of all – the subjects, thus, the king), is moral in itself. As rightly commented by Gautam (2016, p. 51), statecraft in Arthasastra is regulated by dharma.
Upinder Singh (2010, n. 64, p. 29-62) affirms:
“I disagree with scholars who argue that the politics of Arthasastra is devoid of ethics. In fact, ethics was central to the ancient Indian discourse on politics.”
Associating Kautilyan politics with ethics might seem insane to some, as Kautilya is often considered an amoral thinker. Nevertheless, we must not turn a blind eye towards the ultima veritas – dharma regulates danda in Indian strategic thought. Gupta and Holtsmark (2014, p. x) maintain that the Kautilyan conception of statecraft had significant “moral and ethical undertones,” in stark contrast to the “contemporary realist emphasis on aggregate power and material factors.” My engagement with the Arthasastra made me realise that Kautilyan statecraft is nothing but a magnificently prepossessing interplay of dharma, artha, and danda.
Gautam (2016, p. 16) observes:
“Danda is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to understand the sinews of traditional Indian statecraft. In other words, there is a regulating mechanism of dharma with danda.”
Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
Now that we have seen how dharma regulates the use of danda in the Kautilyan paradigm, the question Roman poet Juvenal asked centuries ago rings the doorbell of my mind – Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? How to ensure that the rulers, who are mortal humans, do not fall into the mephitic pit of “a confederated sinister interest” (Bentham, as cited in Klosko, 2013, p. 398)? Especially “since kingship in the Arthasastra was not concerned with divinity” (Vivekananda, 2011, p. 89), how to ensure that the rulers act in accordance with dharma? Whilst the king knows what he ought to do, what force will make him do it?
For Socrates, human beings are inherently good – as their souls have an inherent desire to move towards the good. However, for him, knowledge is good – thus, ‘to know is to be’ – or to know good is to do good. On the other hand, Aristotle proposes that human beings are neither good nor bad – while knowledge tells them what is good, they may choose the wrong path, though they know the good (consider Duryodhana, for instance). For Aristotle, ‘to know is not to be’ – but one becomes good (morally excellent) as a result of practising virtues. He says, “Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit. We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts” (Aristotle, 2023).
Kautilya attempts a synthesis of both Socrates and Aristotle, to ensure that the king knows what he ought to do, be what he ought to be, and do what he ought to do.
Moral Excellence Comes About as a Result of Habit
If moral excellence is the result of habit, Kautilya suggests a plethora of self-restraining exercises in the Arthasastra, which envisages a swami who is self-restrained. He is indriyajaya, the master of his senses, who shall, through constant practice, keep a check on his overpowering passions, and avoid any form of fixation towards vyasanas (vices), including, “passion, anger, greed, obstinacy, fickleness, haste, and back-biting habits.” (Arthasastra, v. 6.1.5)
In contrast to Machiavelli who counsels the Prince to masquerade as an epitome of Cicero’s and Seneca’s list of princely virtues (liberality, honesty, and magnanimity), especially by citing Cesare Borgia’s act of publicly hanging his General, who, upon the former’s orders, crushed the rebellion with an iron fist; Kautilya proposes the swami to actually possess swamisampad or princely virtues, including abhigamikah gunah (qualities of inviting nature), prajna gunah (qualities of intellect), and utsaah gunah (aspects of enthusiasm).
King possessing abhigamikah gunah shall be (Arthasastra, v. 6.1.2):
“Possessed of valour… virtuous, truthful, not of a contradictory nature, grateful, having large aims, highly enthusiastic, not addicted to procrastination… of resolute mind… possessed of a taste of discipline.”
Prajna gunah includes qualities like “inquiry, hearing, perception, retention in memory, reflection, deliberation, inference, and steadfast adherence to conclusions” (Arthasastra, v. 6.1.3). Similarly, utsaah gunah includes “Valour, determination of purpose, quickness and probity” (Arthasastra, v. 6.1.4).
Swami shall also possess aatmasampad (nature of self-possession or personal qualities), which includes (Arthasastra, v. 6.1.5):
“A sharp intellect, keen memory, and keen mind… [and shall be] energetic, powerful, trained in all kinds of arts, free from vice… possessed of dignity; capable of taking remedial measures against dangers, possessed of foresight… making jokes with no loss of dignity or secrecy…free from passion, anger, greed, obstinacy, fickleness, haste, and back-biting habits.”
Therefore, Kautilya envisages regulation of the king’s behaviour through constant practice, cultivating in him, moral excellence, and the propensity to do the ‘good’ – i.e., dharma. Kautilya’s emphasis on moral excellence (to be achieved through constant practice) made Brown (1964, p. 25) declare:
“Dharma [is] the ultimate basis of Indian political thought… Indeed, the moral behaviour of the ruler may be taken as a cornerstone of Indian thought… Over and over again, the Indian theorist stresses the prime necessity for the ruler and his ministers [to conquer] personal desire for pleasure and power and holding the duties imposed by office and law.”
To Know is to Be
Whilst Kautilya groomed the king to develop, in his soul, the propensity to do the ‘good,’ how does he know what is ‘good’ in the first place? If to know is to be, how Kautilya attempts to inculcate in him the knowledge of the ‘good’?
This takes us to Kautilya’s system of education for the king. (Arthasastra, v. 1.5.13-14). It includes the study of itihasa (lore), encompassing puranas, trayi (the Vedas), vartta (economics), danda (politics), dharmasastra (law), and itivrtta (reports).
Patrick Olivelle (2012, p. 471) suggests that “the meaning of reports (itivrtta) is unclear, although a commentary identifies [it with] the epics Mahabharata and Ramayana.”
Kautilya, by wanting the rulers to be well-versed in the epics and the puranas, therefore, attempts to inculcate in them the moral values camouflaged in these texts, both at the personal level (for developing swamisampad and aatmasampad), and at the political level, when it relates to its practical use in statecraft.
Hence, by ethical education, Kautilya attempts to knit together in the ruler, the strands of ethics and morality, which would further light his path to using danda in achieving the end of sukham. Thus, Kangle (1997, p. 139-140) rightfully asserts that:
“There is thus no reason to doubt that there is no constitutional check thought of in [the Arthasastra] on the absolute power of the monarch. What checks are thought of are indirect… The fact that [the king] would be brought up to regard the Vedic way of life as sacred and the performance of his own duties in accordance with that scheme of life as a means of achieving spiritual ends would also serve to make him behave with moderation.”
Hence, the education system provided to the incoming ruler, along with the self-restraining exercises to acquire moral excellence through incessant practice, acts as an indirect check on the malicious use of danda by the king.
Conclusion
“The [ruler] severe with danda, becomes a source of terror to beings. The [ruler] just with danda is honoured… [The] administration [of danda], rooted in self-discipline, brings security and well-being to living beings.”
Kautilya (Arthasastra, v. 1.4.5-10, 1.5.1)
I began this paper by attempting to establish a relationship of harmony between dharma and danda. I examined how, in the absence of a divine notion of kingship in the Arthasastra, the use of danda is envisaged to be principled. I concluded that dharma begets and restrains danda. Hence, I concluded that it is the duty of the king to ensure restraint in using danda, as it is limited by the purpose of the social contract – the end goal of sukham.
But this left us with another problem to grapple with. As the Kautilyan notion of kingship is not divine – the king being a mere mortal – how to expect him to pursue dharma? How does Kautilya institutionalise a system such that the limitless power of the rod of governance bestowed upon him is channelised towards achieving the end of statecraft? I established that Kautilya actualises it through a well-engineered education system that combines both Socratic and Aristotelian maxims on morality. The training of the incoming rulers in the epics and the Vedas, including the practice of rigorous self-restraining exercises, acts as an indirect check on their behaviour.
Like Mill, Kautilya believed in the “transformative power of education” (Mill, as cited in Klosko, 2013, p. 414, 446), which would help individuals develop their mental and moral faculties, and develop an understanding and adherence to “social utilities” (Mill, as cited in Klosko, 2013, p. 423) – which, here, is “happiness” through the principled application of danda.
And I end this piece with a question planted in me by my guide, Dr. Sri Ram Pandeya – is Kautilya really immoral?
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The author, Adwaith PB, is a student at Ramjas College, University of Delhi
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