As published in the Volume 2(1) of Ramjas Political Review
Abstract
‘When does loyalty to the state give way to the demands of conscience?’ This essay tackles this question by exploring the tension between political obligation and moral duty, guided by the ideas of Judith Shklar, Isaiah Berlin, and MQ Sibley. It examines how government betrayal can erode citizens' loyalty, particularly for those exiled by injustice. By reinterpreting Berlin's concepts of liberty through Shklar's lens, it shows how rights and conscience intersect to challenge the state's authority. Using the abolitionist movement in the United States (US) as a case study, it argues that when rights are violated, conscience compels disobedience, reshaping the boundaries of political obligation.
Keywords: Obligation, Loyalty, Disobedience, Conscience, Ethics of Politics
Introduction
In a world where political obligation and moral duty often collide, Shklar's inquiry strikes at the heart of a perennial dilemma: when does obligation as well as loyalty to the state end, and obligation to conscience begin? In this essay, first, I will elaborate on Shklar’s arguments to lay a foundation for the essay. Second, I will explore what really causes the elimination of obligation and loyalty when the government “betrays” its citizens. Drawing upon Shklar and Berlin’s insights, I will analyse the intersections of conscience, liberty, and rights. Third, using Sibley’s arguments, I will elaborate on what constitutes disobedience on the ground of conscience and what its limits are. Additionally, I will examine Shklar's example of abolitionism in the United States, using Sibley’s principles, to argue that there is more to disobedience and its ways of doing.
What Does Shklar Mean?
Judith Shklar was a prominent political theorist who fled Europe in her childhood, to escape persecution as a Jew and settled in the United States. As a result of her exile from her home country, her work focused on themes of injustice, political obligation, and the moral dimensions of political life. Her work, ranging from books, articles, and lectures on ethics and politics, has left a lasting impact on political theory. The main question that Shklar poses in her work – Obligation, Loyalty, and Exile, is whether one still has the obligation and, or, loyalty if the government betrays them. To answer this, she delves into her nuanced distinctions between these concepts and explores how they manifest, particularly in the context of exiles.
Shklar (1993, p. 183) delineates political obligation as a rational, rule-governed conduct demanded by public agencies. She contrasts this with loyalty, which is the affective and emotional attachment to social groups, membership to which is not necessarily voluntary (Shklar, 1993, p. 184). For instance, patriotism to one's country, often involuntary, embodies loyalty, while political obligation stems from rational adherence to governmental demands. She recognises that both of them invite conflict but also sustain each other (Shklar, 1993, p. 186). The former is inevitable as she hints towards multiple loyalties and obligations existing simultaneously. The latter is possible when state and nationality coincide (Shklar, 1993, p. 187), which means part of one’s loyalties, as that to one’s country, is not in conflict with their political obligation to the government.
Shklar then delves into the complex scenario of exiles, shedding light on their relationship with obligation and loyalty to the state. An exile is of two kinds — involuntarily leaving their country due to the threat of harm to themselves and their family (an involuntary émigré) (Shklar, 1993, p. 187), and being surrounded by so much injustice within the boundaries of the nation that their loyalty and obligation are eroded (internal exiles) (Shklar, 1993, p. 195). She then focuses on internal exiles and argues that their ground for disobedience is “pure conscience” (Shklar, 1993, p. 194). Hence, drawing upon historical examples, Shklar (1993, pp. 188-193) illustrates how “injustice” by the government undermines citizens' sense of obligation and erodes their loyalty. While Shklar convincingly argues for the erosion of obligation and loyalty in the face of governmental injustice, further exploration is warranted into the exact understanding of injustice and conscience.
Liberty, Rights, and Conscience
In her insightful lecture at Berkeley, Shklar (2019) extended her argument of conscience as being intricately connected to the question of liberty. In this section, I will first lay down what Berlin’s conception of negative and positive liberties was and point out how Shklar differs in her understanding of liberty, as connected to rights. Second, I will bring to the fore how rights, in the US, are connected to conscience and liberty, to finally show that injustice, by being denied rights, leads to diminishing liberty, and thus, invokes conscience.
Isaiah Berlin, in his work – Four Essays on Liberty – distinguishes between negative and positive liberty while equating liberty to freedom and separating it from rights, equality, and justice. Negative liberty, which he prefers, entails the absence of interference by others, allowing individuals to act without constraint (Berlin, 2002, p. 169). Positive liberty, in contrast, involves self-mastery and self-autonomy (Berlin, 2002, p. 178). It is the superiority of higher rationality over the lower impulses of an individual (Berlin, 2002, p. 178). He warns against giving primacy to positive liberty as he believes it to be an easy and often employed tool for coercion and authoritarianism (Berlin, 2002, p. 180). This is because the attempts to maximise positive liberty involve a level of self-development (Berlin, 2002, p. 181). But this process can be and has been politicised to misguide people. For example, being told that “education” is required for self-development is actually just the way through which the state tells you what to think “freely”.
Berlin’s argument that politics is about choosing hints towards his acknowledgement of pluralism and conflicting values in society. Shklar (2019, p. 9) initially agrees with it but she extends it by saying that while choosing, we are exercising our conscience (Shklar, 2019, p. 9). Thus, she appears to make a case for a higher self in politics that guides one’s decisions regarding the exercise of what Berlin calls negative liberty. It seems that she attempts to reconcile both liberties with the connecting link being conscience. She asserts that the opportunity to participate in politics should be considered a part of liberty as it involves not just following reasons by overcoming base instincts, i.e., positive liberty, but also having an “open door” to engage in the political process, i.e., negative liberty (Shklar, 2019, p. 10).
While she acknowledges the importance of negative liberty, she also concludes that if negative liberty is given primacy, it might result in complete political "immobility”, where any change could greatly increase the liberty of some while diminishing that of others (Shklar, 2019, p. 10). Absolute negative liberty, which is complete freedom from external interference, is neither feasible nor sustainable. Without regulation, it would concentrate power and freedom in the hands of a few, depriving the majority of their liberties. Isaiah Berlin acknowledged this issue, arguing that unchecked negative liberty could ultimately undermine the freedom it aims to protect by allowing a few to dominate the many (Berlin, 2002, p. 173). This is why Shklar’s conception of liberty helps to focus on positive liberty while not disregarding negative liberty.
Shklar's critique gains profound significance when examining the historical injustices within the US, particularly slavery. Within this context, slave owners enjoyed negative liberty, while slaves were deprived of both negative and positive liberty (Shklar, 2019, p. 12). The systemic denial of liberty to slaves and the tendency to employ it in other facets of life underscores the inherent flaw in the concept of absolute liberty, compelling the necessity for government intervention to rectify this fundamental imbalance. It was only through a government-led expansion of rights for slaves that liberty could be redistributed to all members of society (Shklar, 2019, p. 12).
This highlights that obstacles to the pursuit of liberty are not confined solely to external factors but also include internal barriers, such as acting in contradiction to one's conscience. Lincoln's understanding of freedom is particularly illuminating here. For him, the distinction between external and internal obstacles to liberty is blurred; whether one is enslaved to a master or to one's own passions is inconsequential (Shklar, 2019, p. 13).
Similarly, the abolitionists encountered a unique obstacle to their liberty, one neither external nor rooted in personal desires. Rather, it was the moral dilemma they faced every time they wore a cotton shirt, knowing it was produced through the labour of enslaved individuals (Shklar, 1993, p. 195). This ethical conflict stemmed from the denial of negative liberty to slaves, which in turn restricted the positive liberty of non-slaves even though they enjoyed negative liberty, as it did not allow them to move to higher rationality. Their conscience compelled them to reject complacency in the face of such evil, yet they were unable to fully realise their liberty due to the government's complicity in perpetuating injustice (Shklar, 2019, p. 11). Consequently, the abolitionists felt compelled to distance themselves from a government that upheld slavery by refusing to recognise their obligations (Shklar, 2019, p. 194).
Remarkably, this illustrates that conscience can be invoked, as seen with the abolitionists when the liberty of not only oneself but also others is under threat. According to Shklar (2019, p. 14), rights serve both as a safeguard of negative liberty and as means of redress against those who would oppress oneself or others. It necessitates proactive measures, primarily from the government, to restrain oppressors and safeguard the liberties of its citizens (Shklar, 2019, p. 14). Hence, the government holds an obligation to the citizens to uphold their liberty through the provision of rights. When it fails to fulfil this obligation, our conscience compels us to take action.
Thus, the injustice to which Shklar alludes refers to instances where governmental actions diverge so drastically from or blatantly disregard individual conscience that they result in the denial of liberty through the violation of rights. Then, conscience becomes a legitimate basis for disobedience. However, Shklar (1993, p. 195) acknowledges that such instances of disobedience, though rare, may be perceived as self-serving, potentially rendering them illegitimate. It must be noted that according to Shklar, such events of disobedience on the grounds of conscience are rare – something that she did not provide clarity on. In the subsequent section, I will explore how conscience can serve as a legitimate rationale for both obedience and disobedience to the law or government.
How Conscience Becomes a Ground
In this section, I will first answer what a possible explanation for conscience is. Second, I will note how disobedience can be justified on the grounds of conscience and the principles to be followed in doing so. Finally, I will look at the difference between revolution and civil disobedience using Shklar’s example of Thoreau.
Sibley (1970, p. 559) argues that the conscience of each individual develops through the application of moral objective propositions to the particular circumstances and personalities of each. So, while there does exist a moral order that exists independent of a person's or group’s judgement, the vast individual differences form a barrier to the former’s application. It is important to note that Sibley (1970, p. 567) places great importance on groups, as he opines that one’s existence and personality are made possible by them, imposing a duty towards those groups. Shklar would call this duty loyalty. But then, Sibley (1970, p. 567) argues that if the law is an expression of that group, then one also has a duty to the law, which Shklar would recognise as an obligation. This means that loyalty and obligation coincide when one is obligated to the laws of the same and only the group one is a part of. But he is quick to note that one owes an absolute obligation to one’s conscience, and only a limited obligation to groups and their laws (Sibley, 1970, p. 568); a hierarchy that also seems present in Shklar’s understanding. Hence, while groups play a crucial role in shaping our conscience, they do not demand our obligation while violating our conscience.
It also appears that Sibley aligns with Berlin’s pluralism and associated conflicts with respect to the politics of choice. He agrees that we live in a world of multiple associations of which the state is only one, which requires a choice on our part (Sibley, 1970, p. 568). Here, he echoes Shklar's view on conscience's role. He says that we must weigh the claims of those institutions against i) one another, and ii) our own conscience (Sibley, 1970, p. 569). But is this to say that the state and other institutions of associations exist on the same, or at least similar level, i.e., does the obligation to all of them have the same level of priority? It must be remembered that though states require a choice on our part for association, the sanction in the event of disobedience puts it apart from other forms of institutions of association.
Sibley (1970, p. 562) argues that there will always be a discrepancy between what the law demands and what one’s conscience might hold. He admits that while the law can aspire to be just, it is, at best, a “clumsy instrument” that stands unable to do justice to all the unique personalities present in society (Sibley, 1970, p. 562). The tension becomes apparent when one notices the three requirements he proposes for a good law, from a non-positivist understanding — it must be the result of a system that is morally unobjectionable, it must be made according to the procedures of that system, and it must not violate what the individual regards as basic moral principles (Sibley, 1970, p. 573). It is the last requirement that seems to provide ground for evoking conscience for disobedience.
Moving from this understanding of an order, where do we draw the line with respect to violations of human righteousness, making it legitimate to disobey? Sibley (1970, p. 577), like Shklar, acknowledges that because the law demands obligation, there is an obligation on the part of the government as well. They both agree that if there is a breach on the part of the government, then the obligation of the citizens is reduced. In this case, they are justified in disobeying the law, albeit publicly and non-violently, with the intent to benefit the community (Sibley, 1970, p. 575).
Further, what happens when it is not a law that one is opposed to but the system itself? Sibley (1970, p. 582) recognises this situation by creating a distinction between civil disobedience and revolution. The former involves a general confidence that the system can be improved (Sibley, 1970, p. 582). Disobedience seems limited to law, not the system, as the said law must have passed the first two requirements. But in the latter case, there is a belief that the system at its core is morally questionable and runs outrageously counter to the conceptions of elementary righteousness (Sibley, 1970, p. 583). Thus, it has failed all three requirements of a good law. Then, there is no requirement to maintain lawfulness and non-violence on the part of those disobeying (Sibley, 1970, p. 584). An important question that arises now is whether disobedience and revolution need to be collective or can be individual as well.
I think Shklar’s example of Thoreau and other abolitionists fits Sibley’s understanding of revolution and offers an opportunity to answer the question. Thoreau was not in opposition to a law or specific provisions in the Constitution as he felt that it was entirely, at its core, a “slave document” (Shklar, 1993, p. 194). This means that to him, all the three requirements proposed by Sibley had failed. But he could neither join most of his fellow abolitionists as he was not religious like them nor join the black slaves (Shklar, 1993, p. 195). He was absolutely alone, only with his conscience to depend upon. Interestingly, although Sibley recognises the possibility of using violence during a revolution, Thoreau chose not to engage in the same. Therefore, a revolution or disobedience need not be collective and involve violence. It is essentially a way to mark your disagreement with the government by disobeying its laws on the grounds of your conscience.
Conclusion
In this essay, I explored the dynamic interplay between conscience, liberty, and political obligation through the lenses of three prominent political theorists. Shklar’s analysis reveals how betrayal by the state can undermine both political obligation and emotional loyalty, especially for exiles facing systemic injustice. Her work illustrates the conflict between rational duties to the state and personal moral convictions, particularly when governmental actions violate fundamental rights.
Berlin's concepts of negative and positive liberty provide a brilliant framework for understanding Shklar’s view on conscience and its role in upholding liberty. Shklar argues that true liberty is unattainable if one's conscience is compromised by systemic injustice, as demonstrated by historical examples such as American abolitionism. The role of conscience in driving civil disobedience is further elucidated through Sibley’s distinction between civil disobedience and revolution, highlighting how individuals respond to unjust laws and systems.
While in this essay, my analysis was limited to the historical event of the Abolition movement, future research could explore how modern movements and individuals navigate these tensions and how different cultural contexts influence the application of conscience in political resistance. This will provide a deeper understanding of the profound ideas of Shklar in contemporary times, which have opened the floor for much discourse over the years in political ethics, loyalty, and obligation.
References
Berlin, I., and Hardy, H. (Ed.) (2002). Liberty (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
Shklar, J. N. (1993). Obligation, Loyalty, Exile. Political Theory, 21(2), 181–197.
Shklar, J. N., Ashenden, S., and Hess, A. (Eds.). (2019). On Political Obligation. Yale University Press.
Sibley, M. Q. (1970). Conscience, Law, And The Obligation To Obey. The Monist, Vol. 54(4), 556–586. Oxford
University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902197
The author, Aaditi Sinha, is a student at National Law School of India University (NLSIU), Bangalore.
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